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Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical 
Assessment of the Desirability of a 
Lawyer Career
Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth and Joyce S. Sterling
There is now a consensus critique of legal education, reiterated in the mass 
media and fostered by lawyers and law professors in scholarly works and in 
legal blogs thriving on the case against law school. David Segal in the New 
York Times helped disseminate this view nationally and internationally, putting 
the blame on law school greed and overregulation by the American Bar 
Association.1 The best statement of this argument is Brian Tamanaha’s Failing 
Law Schools.2 The basic idea is that the combination of educational debt and a 
poor job market means that law school for most individuals is simply a bad 
investment. The investment pays off, according to this perspective, only if law 
graduates secure positions in corporate law firms, since the salaries of those 
who work outside the corporate sector are much lower—too low to service the 
debt and enjoy the traditional economic benefits of a professional degree. 
Those who attend elite law schools, the story goes, are far more likely to 
gain access to corporate positions, and therefore they are not as doomed as 
1. David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the ABA’s Way, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/for-law-schools-a-price-to-play-the-
abas-way.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka Ching!, 
N.Y. Times, July 16, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-
school-economics-job-market-weakens-tuition-rises.html?pagewanted=all.
2. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012). A modified version 
of a chapter from Failing Law Schools is published in this symposium of the JLE. See 
also Paul Campos, Don’t Go to Law School (Unless): A Law Professor’s Inside Guide to 
Maximizing Opportunity and Minimizing Risk (CreateSpace Independent Pub. Platform 
2012); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, the Money Gap, and the Responsibility 
of Legal Educators, 41 Was. U. J. L. & Pol’y 1 (2013). A discussion of this debate from 
another perspective is Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal 
Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and 
Legal Education, 23 Stanford L. & Pol’y Rev. 503 (2013). An interesting and recent analysis 
of data from one school is Benjamin Barros, Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom on 
the Legal Job Market (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258806.
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the great majority of law students who are not so fortunate. But even here, 
the picture is painted darkly. The literature suggests that those positions in 
corporate law firms will permanently contract because of corporate reluctance 
to pay high lawyer bills, and because of competition through outsourcing and 
other means of providing legal services facilitated by technological changes 
and globalization.3 But the critics suggest nevertheless that attending law 
school remains a potentially good investment for those who get into the 
highest ranked schools. According to Tamanaha, “For any prospective law 
student trying to figure out the likely economic return on a degree, especially 
a student who borrows $100,000 or more to pay for the education, it comes 
to this: what is one’s chance of landing a NLJ 250 [one of the largest 250 
corporate law firms in the United States] job?”4
The main reason that students continued to apply to non-elite law schools—
at least until the recent major drop-off in applications—was, according to the 
orthodox negative argument, “optimism bias.” Because of this psychological 
bias, applicants to non-elite schools blithely assumed that they would graduate 
at the top of the class and secure one of the relatively few corporate jobs 
available to each school’s graduates. But, of course, only 10 percent graduate 
in the top 10 percent, meaning that 90 percent—or whatever the figure for 
the particular school—would ultimately be disappointed in their decision to 
attend law school. As Tamanaha notes, law students “assume that the reliable 
path to past success will pay off again without fully realizing—until they sit in 
the class and look around—that everyone else in the room is just as smart and 
hard-working. Only after arrival do the long odds of success sink in—and then 
it is too late.”5 They face debt that they will not be able to handle and realize 
that they made a bad decision—a case of massive buyers’ remorse.
There are a variety of proposed solutions to this set of problems. One is 
simply to reduce law school tuition for all but the most elite law schools—
implying less investment in academic scholarship, higher teaching loads for 
professors, and more use of part-time and adjunct professors.6 A proposal that 
has circulated since at least the 1970s has also gained many adherents—abolish 
the third year of law school or at least make it optional.7 As in the past, the 
3. E.g., William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, A.B.A. J., July 2011, at 
40–7, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift (the online 
article is entitled: Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—And It May 
Be a Sign of Lasting Change).
4. Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 143. 
5. Id. at 144.
6. Id. at 20–27.
7. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Samuel Estreicher, Make Law Schools Earn a Third 
Year, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/opinion/
practicing-law-should-not-mean-living-in-bankruptcy.html?_r=0 (“A two-year option, in our 
view, would provide young lawyers with the training they need to get started, lift a heavy 
financial burden off the backs of many—and vastly improve third-year curriculums in the 
process. That would be a big step in the right direction.”). The earlier Carnegie suggestion 
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proposal is mainly intended for non-elite law schools. The general approach 
is to focus on tuition at the schools that are not highly ranked. If tuition is 
reduced, and therefore debt also reduced, these law schools might turn into 
better investments.
This article seeks to add more data to the discussion of the value of law 
school. It begins by looking at the data mustered by the critics, which consists 
essentially of looking at law school debt and starting salaries for law school 
graduates. Next we draw on data from the first two waves of the After the J.D. 
project (AJD project) centered at the American Bar Foundation. The data do 
not contradict the orthodox story of initial debt and starting salaries, but the 
data raise questions about both the optimism bias and the potential resultant 
buyers’ remorse that are key components of the critique of the value of a legal 
education today. There is some support for the critics in the After the J.D. 
data, but the simple story that dominates debate does not hold up very well. 
In short, the posited definitive role of the first legal position in handling debt 
is not supported; nor is the idea that only elite graduates can handle debt; and 
the evidence of mass buyer’s remorse is thin at best.
This analysis admittedly is centered on the pre-crisis law careers of the 
AJD cohort, which began their careers around 2000, and it therefore can be 
criticized as unrepresentative of today’s situation. The concluding part will 
focus on the issue of whether these data apply to the law graduates of the great 
legal recession and beyond.
The Data Behind the Negative Story
The evidence in support of the crisis and the generally proposed solutions 
is pretty easy to describe. There are complaints from law graduates, widely 
circulated on the Internet, and there are a number of high profile lawsuits 
against non-elite law schools based on employment data.8 But most of the 
evidence comes from two kinds of data: starting salaries and debt loads. The 
well-documented characteristic of starting salaries for new lawyers is that the 
curve has two distinct peaks.9 Either one works for a corporate law firm, in 
which case the starting salary will average about $165,000, or one does not, 
was in Herbert L. Packer & Thomas Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal Education (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1972).
8. E.g., Matt Leichter, Law Graduate Overproduction, L. Sch. Tuition Bubble, available at 
http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/law-graduate- 
overproduction; Mission, Law School Transparency, available at http://www.
lawschooltransparency.com/about/mission.
9. This is Tamanaha’s theme: Tamanaha, supra note 2. William Henderson brought this issue to 
the debate. See, e.g., William Henderson, The End of an Era: the Bi-Modal Distribution for the 
Class of 2008, Empirical Legal Studies Blog (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.elsblog.
org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2009/06/the-end-of-an-era-the-bimodal-distribution-for-
the-class-of-2008.html (“The primary takeaway is that the bi-modal distribution did not 
exist in the early 1990s. It first emerged in 2000 (with the dot.com salary wars) and became 
progressively more extreme starting as the decade unfolded.”).
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with averages closer to $50,000. According to NALP data, for 2010 graduates, 
the recession shrunk the number of graduates obtaining the higher salaries: 
This resulted in the right-hand peak eroding back to 18% of reported salaries, 
and the left-hand peak bulking up to almost half (48%) of reported salaries. 
The erosion continued in 2011, with $160,000 salaries accounting for 14% 
of reported salaries, and $40,000–$65,000 salaries accounting for over half 
(52%) of reported salaries. Finally, with so many salaries returning to the left-
hand peak, the median salary—$60,000 for the Class of 2011—again reflects the 
salary, or close to the salary, actually obtained by many grads.10
The critique based on this finding is quite basic. The first jobs for most 
graduates will not sustain the amount required to service law school debt. 
A $50,000 salary will not be able to handle $100,000 or more of debt, but a 
$165,000 salary will allow debt repayment.11 The graduates who start with the 
lower salary will have made a bad investment in legal education. Those who 
have the higher salary—assuming they like their corporate law jobs—will have 
made a good investment. But that group shrank to only 14 percent of reported 
salaries in 2011.
One obvious question, on which we provide some data below, is whether 
the first job should be the only consideration in this debate. There are a few 
problems with the assumption that career debt payment depends on the first 
job.12 One is the possibility, not considered by the critics, that individuals 
who begin in law positions outside of the large corporate firms will grow their 
incomes sufficiently to more easily service the debt. Another complication is 
that a very high percentage of those who start in large corporate law jobs leave 
them within a few years. It may nevertheless be true, as suggested below, that 
starting at a corporate law job gives a permanent boost to a lawyer’s salary 
and career. But any such advantage does not necessarily mean that all other 
starting points translate to law school being a misguided investment by those 
incurring debt to finance that education.
The Data from the After the J.D. Project
The only available longitudinal data for a national sample of lawyers is the 
AJD project, headquartered at the American Bar Foundation and involving 
10. NALP, Salaries for New Lawyers: An Update on Where We Are and How We Got Here 
(Aug. 2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/august2012research. 
11. Phillip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools: Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, Geo. J. L. 
Ethics (forthcoming), has suggested that Tamanaha’s calculation of debt repayment is based 
on a misunderstanding of the current federal law governing educational debt. We are not 
focusing our discussion on the loan forgiveness and repayment options, which obviously 
offer relief if the options remain in place.
12. Herwig J. Schlunk, Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be…Lawyers (Vanderbilt 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 09–29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1497044; Herwig J. Schlunk, Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today? 
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Working Paper No. 11–42, (2011), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1957139 (builds a model that only counts starting salary).
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other partners including NALP. This study tracks more than 4,500 lawyers 
who began their legal careers in the year 2000.13 The project’s Executive 
Coordinating Committee, on which we have served since the project’s 
inception, has overseen three waves of data collection. The first was in 2003, 
the second in 2007, and the third in 2012. The data from the third wave are 
currently being cleaned and readied for analysis, and this paper will draw only 
on the first two waves. We believe that the data from the AJD project are the 
best (and almost only) data available on the issues currently being debated. 
They document how lawyers make their careers in the full range of legal 
positions. They include lawyers from virtually all law schools, and the lawyers 
span the full range of grades and law school activities. 
The data from Waves 1 and 2 came before the dramatic recession. The 
cohort that we follow also started their careers when debt was somewhat lower 
than it is today and arguably before technological changes and globalization 
constricted the number of opportunities for corporate law positions. We 
contend, however, that the story of the legal profession is generally one of 
continuity. Despite the repeated cries of crisis, in fact change is very slow and 
gradual. The period after the recession, therefore, is likely to resemble the 
period before the recession. There are differences, to be sure, including the 
fact that fewer individuals now are applying to law school in the wake of the 
recession and the new critical orthodoxy about the value of a law degree. The 
availability of corporate law positions may also be smaller, but we caution 
against assuming that there will not be growth in the future. As we suggest in 
the concluding part, those who dismiss this analysis on the grounds that it is all 
different today should at the very least do better than reassert the relationship 
between non-corporate starting salaries and debt.
AJD Data on Debt and Repayment
Analyses of the data from Waves 1 and 2 of the AJD project give us a picture 
of the positions and attitudes of lawyers in the first seven years of their careers. 
We begin with AJD data that provide some support for the critique of the 
value of legal education. First, it is clear that where one goes to school does 
matter for securing corporate positions. Of those who graduated from the 
“top ten” law schools (based on the U.S. News rankings for 2003), 66 percent at 
Wave 1 were in firms of more than 100 lawyers and 55 percent were in firms of 
more than 250 lawyers. (See Table 1, Appendix.)
The proportion of law graduates working in the largest firms declines 
quickly with law school tier. We find 51 percent of the graduates of schools 
ranked 11–20 in firms of more than 100, 30 percent for those in schools ranked 
13. There are two reports to date summarizing the findings of Waves 1 and 2. Ronit Dinovitzer 
et al., The NALP Found. for Law Career Research and Educ. & The Am. Bar Found., After 
the J.D.: First Results of a National Study of Legal Careers 47, 89 (2004) [hereinafter After 
the J.D. I]; Ronit Dinovitzer et al., The Am. Bar Found. & The NALP Found. for Law 
Career Research and Educ., After the J.D. II: Second Results from a National Study of 
Legal Careers 46, 80–81 (2009) [hereinafter After the J.D. II]. 
Buyers’ Remorse?
216	 Journal of Legal Education
21–50, 20 percent in those schools ranked 51–100, 14 percent in Tier 3, and 
7 percent in Tier 4.14 Thus, even before the downturn in the market, only a 
very small proportion of third and fourth tier law school graduates obtained 
positions in large law firms. 
In Wave 2, which collected data when lawyers were about seven years into 
their careers, the numbers were substantially smaller, reflecting the steady 
attrition that occurs in early careers in large law firms: 33 percent of the top 
ten, 27 percent of the 11–20 group, 16 percent in the 21–50 category, 16 percent 
in the 51–100 category, 14 percent for Tier 3, and 4 percent for Tier 4 were in the 
large firm category. (See Table 2, Appendix.)
It is also clear that only those who do very well academically in non-elite law 
schools gain access to starting positions in corporate law firms. At the top ten 
law schools, graduates without high grades—a group we classified as below 3.37 
self-reported grades—appeared in virtually the same percentages in the largest 
law firms as those with higher grades in Wave 1. But for graduates of schools 
in the top 21–100, almost twice as many with the higher grades as opposed to 
lower grades were found in the largest law firms in Wave 1. We recognize that 
grades as such vary and class standing matters more than specific numerical 
grades, but the data are consistent with the generally recognized pattern. The 
odds of going to a corporate law firm—in an era where hiring numbers were 
substantially higher than they are today—were very high for the leading law 
schools, no matter what grades were achieved, slightly less than a third for 
schools ranked 21–100, and then dramatically lower for all other law schools. 
By Wave 2, the elite graduates drop by approximately half in their appearance 
in large law firms, regardless of their law school grade point averages. They 
move into other areas of employment whether or not they had high grades in 
law school.
 Looking at income more directly, data from Wave 2 suggest again that 
grades do not matter for the top ten graduates, but they are important for 
graduates of law schools outside of the top ten. Thus there is a drop off for 
the rest of the top 100 at 3.25, and there is a drop for the third and fourth tiers 
at 3.5. The income is also generally higher for graduates of the higher ranked 
schools, which is consistent with the finding that, at least as of Wave 2, there 
may be a lasting advantage from beginning one’s career in a corporate law 
firm.15 But, as noted above, the lasting advantage is not the same as saying that 
a successful career must begin in a corporate law firm (or a position that feeds 
corporate firms such as a judicial clerkship). (See Table 3, Appendix.)
Indeed, in contrast with this story so far, which focuses on initial employment 
in corporate law firms, there is evidence of “successful” early careers outside of 
the corporate law sector. The AJD data showed some economic progress for the 
14. Percentages of AJD respondents working in large firms at Wave 1 and Wave 2 are reported 
for respondents who answered both Wave 1 and Wave 2 questionnaires. See After the J.D. II, 
supra note 13, at 86–90 (Tables A and B in Appendix, N = 2664). 
15. Ronit Dinovitzer, The Financial Rewards of Elite Status in the Legal Profession, 36 Law & 
Soc. Inquiry 971, 984–5 (2011).
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cohort as a whole between years 3 and 7. The median for solo practitioners went 
up 60 percent from $50,000 to $80,000; for small firm lawyers from $55,000 to 
$90,000; and for state government lawyers from $44,500 to $65,000. Overall 
the change in the median was up 40 percent, well exceeding inflation. The 
median for large corporate lawyers went up from $135,000 to $180,000, very 
high in absolute numbers, but at 33 percent it is a lower percentage increase. 
Substantial percentage increases no doubt help to ease the debt burden. 
Again, those were relatively good years for the legal profession, but they show 
that as of 2007 the incomes for lawyers in all sectors were moving pretty well.
The data from the AJD project suggest also that there is more mobility 
between the sectors than the debate suggests. One problem with the focus on 
the initial large law firm position—and the large firm salary—as key to paying 
debt is that graduates do not stay in those positions. The high percentage of 
elite law graduates in corporate law firms, as noted above, declines by about 
50 percent between Waves 1 and 2. At the same time, we see that 38 percent 
of AJD lawyers who began their careers in medium firms have moved to large 
firms by Wave 2. This evidence suggests that mobility into large firms is not 
restricted to the elite graduates.
A further complication is that graduates of elite schools, who have easier 
access to large law firms, are less likely to stay. On the other hand, we find that 
graduates from lower ranked schools who do secure positions in the large firms, 
are less likely to exit this setting by their seventh year of practice. 16 Among 
graduates from schools ranked 51–100, we found 20 percent of these graduates 
in large firms at Wave 1 and that figure experienced a small decline to only 16.5 
percent by Wave 2. Similarly, we found that 14 percent of graduates from Tier 
3 schools started their careers in large firms, and the same percentage remained 
in those firms after seven years of practice. The basic idea is that those who are 
more likely to come from disadvantage, and who also do not have the same 
range of options that elite law graduates have, are more likely to stay on and 
work the tremendous hours required at the large law firms.17 The persistence 
of these lawyers in large firms may also be supported by our findings from 
analysis of urban law school graduates during the Wave 1 analysis.18 Graduates 
from urban law schools could generally count on a support network of other 
graduates in the urban settings in which they were located.
16. For reasons for differences between elite and non-elite graduates, see Ronit Dinovitzer & 
Bryant Garth, Not that into You, American Lawyer, Sept. 2009, at 57–9, available at http://
www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/001090904americanbar.
pdf; Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm 
Apprenticeship: Doing the Time, Finding the Love, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1361 (2009). 
17. For a more complete discussion and analysis of this process, see Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant 
Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of Structuring Legal Careers, 41 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
1 (2007).
18. Joyce Sterling, Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, The Changing Social Role of Urban Law 
Schools, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 389–422 (2007).
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We now focus on debt, which for the AJD project includes all educational 
debt, not just law school debt. Supporting the critical view, those who attended 
higher ranking law schools were more likely to have no debt seven years after law 
school (at Wave 2). Among those working in the private practice of law, those 
in the large law firms were also the most likely to have no debt remaining—38 
percent as compared to under one third in other private practice settings. 
Interestingly, however, those in federal government settings, public interest 
careers, and working in business either as inside counsel or not practicing law 
were as likely as those in large firms to have no debt by Wave 2 (reporting 
37 percent or 38 percent no debt, respectively). The lawyers outside of large 
firm practice who have paid off their debt have either benefited from loan 
forgiveness, enjoyed the benefit of family resources that allayed the need to 
borrow, or been particularly frugal. Those who graduated from higher ranking 
schools and had remaining debt tended to have less debt than those from lower 
ranked schools even though the graduates of the top ten law schools began 
with about a $10,000 greater debt load than the others at Wave 1. The means 
were $46,000 for the top ten, $53,000 for the 11–20 group, $54,000 for 21–100, 
$60,000 for the third tier, and $67,000 for the fourth tier.19 In terms of the issue 
of access to law school and economic hardship, it is also lamentable that seven 
years into their careers African-American and Hispanic law graduates at the 
time of Wave 2 had substantially more debt remaining ($70,000 and $62,000, 
respectively) than Asian ($54,000) or white law graduates ($54,000).20 The 
percentages with no debt are also notable for this stage in their careers. Zero 
debt was 17 percent for African-Americans, 22 percent for Hispanic, 48 percent 
for Asians, and 36 percent for white. (See Table 4, Appendix.)
Second, we note that the AJD group benefited from the distinction between 
public and private law schools, which is now evaporating as tuitions become 
much more comparable across the public–private divide.21 On average, 
graduates from public law schools in our sample had approximately $20,000–
$25,000 less in debt than graduates of private schools at Wave 1 irrespective 
of law school rank. By Wave 2, we find increased variation in debt levels 
based on the public/private distinction. The smallest gap in debt between 
private and public schools is found at the top 10 schools (we see only a $2,244 
difference between private and public graduates). The graduates from schools 
19. The means values for debt exclude individuals who reported $0 debt. 
20. That racial minorities incur higher educational debt loads is consistent with findings of 
educational debt studies more broadly. See, e.g., Tracey King & Ellynee Bannon, The Burden 
of Borrowing: A Report on the Rising Rates of Student Loan Debt (2002), available at http://
www.pirg.org/highered/BurdenofBorrowing.pdf; Sandy Baum & Marie O’Malley, College 
on Credit: How Borrowers Perceive their Education Debt: Results of the 2002 National 
Student Loan Survey (Nellie Mae 2003), available at http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/
FIN_AID/SALMAEUS/N030225B.pdf.
21. Research on undergraduate educational debt finds important differences in the effects of 
debt across the public private divide, especially in relation to social class status. See Rachel 
E. Dwyer, Laura McCloud & Randy Hodson, Debt and Graduation from American 
Universities, 90 Soc. Forces 1133–55 (2012).
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ranked either 21–50 or those in Tier 3 showed the next smallest difference in 
debt between private and public schools ($12,643 and $13,420 respectively). 
The remaining graduates from schools ranked 11–20, 51–100 or Tier 4 have 
approximately an $18,000–$20,000 greater debt if they graduated from a 
private law school. The findings suggest differences in debt between private 
and public law schools are not necessarily linear (see Tables 5 and 6). In any 
event, the advantages of attending a public law school in the last few years 
appear to be disappearing, as evidenced by the huge increases in tuition at 
the University of California law schools since the AJD population graduated. 
There is some evidence, in short, that elite graduates have a prettier picture 
when it comes to debt, especially if they start their careers at a corporate law 
firm. 
The After the J.D. data also included questions that asked respondents to 
reflect on the effects of debt on their careers and personal lives. Through a 
factor analysis, we created two composite variables based on these questions. 
One captures the influence of debt on personal decisions, including whether 
to buy a house, and when and whether to have children. The other captures 
career impacts, including which sector to work in, which job to take, whether 
to work at all, and where to live. 
Results from a multiple regression analysis indicate that a higher income, a 
position in a large law firm (>101 lawyers and >251 lawyers), or graduation from 
a top ten and top 20 law school all significantly reduce the reported effect of 
debt on personal choices—controlling for levels of initial debt and the percent 
of debt remaining at Wave 2. Further, as initial debt and the percent of debt 
remaining by Wave 2 increase, so does the reported negative impact of debt on 
one’s personal life. The magnitude of this effect is exemplified by the reported 
impact of debt on buying a home. About 30 percent of Tier 3 and 4 graduates 
versus around 20 percent of top 20 law school graduates reported a strong 
influence of debt on their home buying decision. 
In contrast, regression analysis of the influence of debt on one’s career shows 
some opposite trends: those from the top 10 and top 11–20 law schools report 
significantly greater career impacts. Interestingly, working in medium to large 
firm settings (from more than 21 lawyers to greater than 251) also increases the 
likelihood of reporting that debt had a negative impact on one’s career, while 
working in nongovernmental public settings significantly reduced negative 
reports. Further, in bivariate analyses, graduates of the top ten law schools 
were the only group of law graduates for whom more than half reported that 
debt had a strong impact on what job to take.
 Some of these relationships are difficult to explain, since they relate not 
only to debt but also to jobs available. It may be, for example, that the reason 
graduates of top ten law schools report more of an influence on which job to 
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take is because they have easier access to the corporate law jobs. But the basic 
story is not one of debt as a stifling problem for non-corporate lawyers.22
Next we focus on a particular statistic that bears on economic well-being 
for law graduates—the crucial relationship of graduates’ debt to their income.23 
The question is how those percentages have changed from Wave 1 to Wave 2. 
Tables 8 and 9 show that the percentage reductions are on the average greater 
for the graduates of the lower ranked law schools, whether private or public; 
and the reductions are lower as a percentage in the category of most elite 
schools. In particular, graduates of top ten private law schools reduced their 
debt–income ratio by 23 percent, and graduates from Tiers 3 and 4 reduced 
that ratio by 35 and 32 percent respectively. We do not know exactly why 
graduates of relatively lower ranked law schools are more aggressively paying 
off their debt, but this phenomenon is consistent with the intuitive notion that 
elite graduates—who tend to come from relative privilege—are focused less on 
money issues and therefore more likely to take for granted that they will be 
able to handle the debt whenever they choose to.24 The main point, however, 
is that the actual pattern of educational debt repayment tells a very different 
story than the story of the critics who assert that only corporate lawyers will 
be successful in reducing their debt. Graduates of schools where relatively few 
obtain corporate law positions are succeeding in paying down their debts at a 
rate that exceeds those from the elite schools. 
AJD Evidence on Buyers’ Remorse
The assumption of the current literature critical of investment in law school 
is that those who have borrowed substantially and do not gain access to the 
corporate sector have made a bad career decision to choose law, and they will 
regret that decision. Optimism bias will give way to buyer’s remorse. Seven 
years into a career represents a relatively good time to assess the attitudes of 
law graduates about their decision to attend law school. By year seven they 
should have a realistic idea of where they are going in the legal profession—
which opportunities are open and which ones are closed. The AJD provides a 
rich source on issues of satisfaction with career choices.25 
22. While this analysis draws on the entire sample of respondents who completed Wave 1 and/
or Wave 2, the findings are substantively similar when we restrict the sample to respondents 
who responded to both waves. In this article, whenever we report bivariate analyses, we do 
so based only on the sample in which we have basic demographic data from both waves. 
The sample of Wave 1 and Wave 2 respondents is 2889, although missing data reduces the 
numbers for some of the analyses. The analysis allows us to see what precisely happened to 
those who were in both data sets, and gives us a more directed picture of change over time.
23. This is the emphasis of Schrag, supra note 11.
24. See, e.g., the discussion of student “debt culture” in Steven Brint & Mathew Baron Rotondi, 
Student Debt, the College Experience, and Transitions to Adulthood (2008), available at 
http://www.higher-ed2000.ucr.edu/Publications/Brint%20and%20Rotondi%20(2008).
pdf (paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting in Boston, 
MA).
25. See, e.g., Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 17.
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There is no question that law school is a substantial investment, and there 
is some evidence that the factors just discussed about legal careers have an 
impact on how that investment is assessed. The AJD questionnaire includes 
questions about satisfaction with the decision to become a lawyer and on the 
value of investment in law school. With respect to investment in law school, 
we rely on two questions from the Wave 2 survey. One is whether the “law 
degree” was a “good career investment,” and the other is, “If I had to do it 
again, I would still choose to have gone to law school.” Responses are on 
a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and 7 indicating strong 
agreement. We combined the two items to form one scale reflecting an overall 
measure of whether law school is worthwhile (with a top score thus equaling 
14). Consistent with what we have suggested before, those from the top ten 
law schools had the highest mean of all groups (11.08), which is statistically 
significant. But for graduates of lower ranked law schools, the scores were not 
much lower, with means ranging from 10.11 for the group ranked 11–20 to 10.64 
for the graduates of the third tier law schools (and none of the means were 
statistically significant when compared to the group mean). 
Furthermore, these are all relatively high scores, suggesting that respondents 
generally report that law school was worthwhile irrespective of law school 
attended. If we look at the responses to these questions according to amount 
of remaining debt, those with the highest remaining debt at Wave 2, roughly 
$100,000 or higher (about 28 percent of the sample), reported a mean of 9.9, 
while those with $30,000 or less in remaining debt reported means around 11. 
While this is a constrained range, the differences here are indeed significant. 
The critics have a point for the roughly one-quarter of graduates who both 
borrowed substantially and have had difficulty paying it down. They do have 
a significantly lower assessment of the value of their investment in law school—
some at least relative buyers’ remorse.
Interestingly, there are only a few differences between how the investment 
in a legal education is assessed at Wave 2 in relation to the practice setting 
within which a law graduate works. Those working in state government report 
significantly lower scores (p<.05), while those in the federal government and 
large law firms report mean scores that are only marginally significantly above 
the mean for the sample (p<.10).
To look more deeply at this topic, we ran a regression model to assess 
which factors influenced respondents’ attitudes towards law as a good career 
investment, relying on the two-item composite measure described above. The 
factors that significantly increased positive ratings of law school as worthwhile 
included salary, being African-American, being over 40 years of age, working 
as a practicing lawyer, and working in the non-governmental public sector. 
The factors that reduced the sentiment that law school was worthwhile 
include graduating from a top 11–20 school, the amount of educational debt 
at graduation and the percent of debt remaining at Wave 2. Other notable 
categories—attending a top ten law school, grade point average, and job 
settings—were simply not significant. 
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Our “bottom line” question in the survey is, “how satisfied are you with 
your decision to become a lawyer,” and the responses range from extremely 
satisfied to extremely dissatisfied on a 5 point scale; here we rely on the Wave 
2 data, and we have dichotomized the responses into those who report they 
are “extremely or moderately satisfied” compared to all others. There are some 
expressions of remorse about the decision to become a lawyer. Those who had 
the highest level of educational debt remaining (over $100,000) are the least 
enthusiastic with their decision to become a lawyer, with 28 percent reporting 
that they are ambivalent or dissatisfied. But this is a relatively small group 
even among those with high remaining debt, and the overall trend is that more 
than three-quarters of respondents, irrespective of debt, express extreme or 
moderate satisfaction with the decision to become a lawyer.
In order to better understand the predictors of satisfaction in relation to 
educational debt, we ran a logistic regression model controlling for a range 
of demographic variables. While a higher salary significantly increases 
the likelihood of reporting moderate to extreme satisfaction (along with 
practicing law, being over 40, having children, and being Hispanic), law 
school attended, current job, and a host of other factors do not serve to 
differentiate law graduates on the question of whether they were happy with 
their decision to become a lawyer. Notably, the size of initial debt actually 
increases the likelihood of reporting moderate to extreme satisfaction, while 
the percent of debt remaining by Wave 2 has no significant relationship with 
career satisfaction. 
Finally, we have composite indices of satisfaction that provide more detail 
about how lawyers assess their current position. They relate (1) to the substance 
of the work; (2) a “power track” relating to compensation, recognition, 
and opportunities to advance; (3) the job setting; and (4) a “social index” 
comprised of diversity of the workplace and satisfaction with opportunities for 
pro bono.26 Multiple regression analyses reveal that corporate lawyers score 
the highest on the power track and are relatively low on satisfaction with the 
job setting. On the other hand, working in government or public interest is 
related to significantly higher reported levels of satisfaction with the social 
index and the job setting—as a result of more reasonable hours, for example. 
Not surprising, higher salaries are significantly related to increased levels of 
satisfaction with the power track but lower ones in job setting—including 
control over work and hours. The large law firm is the paradigm for these 
numbers. One curiosity, however, is the solo practitioner category predicts 
higher scores on both the power track and the social index, suggesting there 
are some benefits to this setting—even though it is often deemed to be the last 
resort for unemployed lawyers. But significantly for the current debate, we 
find that educational debt (both initial debt and percent remaining by Wave 
2) has no significant relationship to any of the dimensions of job satisfaction 
that we investigated. 
26. These scales are discussed in the reports for After the J.D. I, supra note 13, and After the J.D. 
II, supra note 13.
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These findings are instructive. When directly asked whether debt has had 
an effect on their careers and personal lives, we find respondents attribute 
some role to debt in their choices. At the same time, we find little evidence 
that debt has an important relationship to levels of career satisfaction or to 
particular aspects of job satisfaction. 
Thus, the AJD data suggest pretty strongly that the picture of optimism 
bias and buyers’ remorse does not accurately describe these lawyers seven 
years into their careers. The critics have fixed on the importance of access to 
corporate careers as the only route to a successful career in law because the 
high compensation of large law firms presumably best absorbs law school debt, 
and that this path is difficult for lower ranked law graduates to access. The 
data provide mixed support for this story. In contrast to the critics’ orthodox 
critique, there is no evidence that law graduates who pursue careers outside 
the corporate law firms express remorse for their choices.
It is also worth noting that many critics propose a “remedy” that is in 
accord with the argument of remorse.27 One recipe for reform stems from the 
argument that, since law graduates from lower ranked schools have relatively 
long odds against gaining access to corporate law positions, then they really 
do not need a third year of legal education loaded with frills not essential to 
ordinary law practice. The resultant savings in tuition and opportunity cost, 
according to this logic, would limit debt and make it easier for non-corporate 
lawyers to survive economically. 
The AJD survey bears on this question. The survey asks law graduates 
whether they agree with the proposition that the third year of law school “was 
largely superfluous.” One-third of women agreed as compared to 44 percent 
of males, which is a significant difference. Some 47 percent of large corporate 
lawyers agreed, which is the highest of any job category. Similarly, 44 percent 
of graduates of top ten law schools agreed, as compared to 35 percent of Tier 3 
or 4 law graduates, again a significant difference. In sum, most law graduates 
thought the third year was not superfluous, and those from lower tiers were 
most likely to support the third year.
There could be a number of reasons for these differences. One is the 
stereotype that the elite schools tend to have seminars on esoteric topics in the 
third year as compared to the very practical third year instruction from lower 
ranked schools. Another is that those who are not the best test takers felt that 
the third year helped them prepare for the bar exam and for legal practice. But 
the results do not at all conform with the basic assumption of the proponents 
of the two-year degree as a solution to the professional crisis. 
After the J.D. and Today’s Purported Crisis
 The data from the AJD project show at the very least that the conventional 
story of crisis is vastly oversimplified. The focus on first jobs and debt may 
be misleading, and the paradigm of optimism bias and buyers’ remorse has 
27. See Tamanaha, supra note 2; Rodriguez & Estreicher, supra note 7.
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very little empirical support. We are unaware of competing data to sustain 
the orthodox critique. The easiest way to counter our data therefore is to say 
that they refer to a cohort from a prosperous time. But even in those boom 
years, when large law firms had an insatiable appetite for law graduates, it is 
notable that only 3 percent of fourth tier law graduates obtained jobs in large 
law firms. The relationship between law school tier and the job market for new 
lawyers is thus not a new story, and the AJD data speak directly to the career 
trajectories and experiences of all of these law graduates. 
The AJD data are also from a time when neither debt nor tuition were what 
they became more recently. The tuition for graduates entering the bar in 2000 
continued to go up at a faster rate than inflation for another decade, and debts 
soared with that tuition.28 It can also be argued that the rosy job situation 
prior to the crisis will never return for the corporate sector. We cannot deny 
that it is somewhat different today, but the question of when tuition and debt 
really became “too much” is somewhat arbitrary. One could have said the 
same thing about the crisis of tuition and debt for decades. In the late 1980s, 
in particular, the problem of debt already had notable doomsayers, including 
John Kramer and David Chambers.29 Yet the increases continued. It may be 
that some tipping point has now been reached, but what really changed was 
the arrival of an economic crisis. Thus while the context is somewhat changed, 
our analysis suggests that the best way to examine the situation is not to focus 
strictly on debt and on first jobs in the corporate sphere. Data from the AJD 
cohort suggests that the situation is much more complex. Satisfaction with the 
decision to be a lawyer is not contingent on getting a corporate job, debt does 
not decrease career satisfaction, and the payment of debt does not depend on 
access to corporate law jobs. 
Those who graduated in the most severe recession since the great depression 
in the 1930s faced very difficult environments to find legal work, but so did 
everyone else. There may be permanent changes in the profession coming out 
of the recession, but the likelihood is that the story of the immediate future will 
be more consistent with the pre-recession time than the recession. So far, we do 
not have evidence that the choice of a law school outside of the relatively few 
elite schools is perceived by graduates as a mistake or objectively leads only to 
unsuccessful careers. 
28. This tracks the trends in rising levels of educational debt more generally both at the college 
and professional school level. See, e.g., Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, Generation 
Hobbled by the Soaring Cost of College, N.Y. Times, May 12, 2012, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/student-loans-weighing-down-a-generation-with-
heavy-debt.html?pagewanted=all. Concern over high levels of educational debt is a focus 
of discussion among a range of professions, notably in medicine. See, e.g., S. Ryan Greysen, 
Candice Chen & Fitzhugh Mullan, A History of Medical Student Debt: Observations and 
Implications for the Future of Medical Education, 86 Acad. Med. 840–5 (2011).
29. See David L. Chambers, Educational Debts and the Worsening Position of Small-Firm, 
Government, and Legal-Services Lawyers, 39 J. Legal Educ. 709, 709 (1989); John R. 
Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on the Table for the Other Guy, 39 J. 
Legal Educ. 655, 686–7 (1989); John R. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, 
by Whom, and How?, 36 Duke L.J. 240, 263–4 (1987). 
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Appendix
Table 1. Wave 1 Practice Setting by Law School Rank*
Law school rank
Total
Top 10 11-20 21-50 51-100 Tier 3 Tier 4
Solo
N= 1 10 12 34 23 27 107
% 0.3% 3.2% 2.2% 4.7% 5.3% 8.2% 4.0%
Small firm
N = 8 42 120 181 133 123 607
% 2.6% 13.6% 21.5% 24.9% 30.8% 37.2% 22.8%
21-100 firm
N = 20 35 75 116 64 29 339
% 6.5% 11.4% 13.4% 16.0% 14.8% 8.8% 12.7%
Large 101-250 
firm
N = 34 44 49 51 27 12 217
% 11.0% 14.3% 8.8% 7.0% 6.2% 3.6% 8.1%
Mega 251+ firm
N = 171 113 120 96 34 11 545
% 55.3% 36.7% 21.5% 13.2% 7.9% 3.3% 20.5%
Govt leg serv & 
pub int
N = 33 31 106 139 73 73 455
% 10.7% 10.1% 19.0% 19.1% 16.9% 22.1% 17.1%
Non-profit
N = 30 19 34 45 19 23 170
% 9.7% 6.2% 6.1% 6.2% 4.4% 6.9% 6.4%
Business
N = 6 5 23 31 34 15 114
% 1.9% 1.6% 4.1% 4.3% 7.9% 4.5% 4.3%
Other
N = 6 9 19 33 25 18 110
% 1.9% 2.9% 3.4% 4.5% 5.8% 5.4% 4.1%
Total
N = 309 308 558 726 432 331 2664
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of 
Total 11.6% 11.6% 20.9% 27.3% 16.2% 12.4% 100.0%
*Table based on respondents who answered both W1 and W2 surveys
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Table 2. Wave 2: Practice Setting by Law School Rank*
Law school rank
Total
Top 10 11-20 21-50 51-100 Tier 3 Tier 4
Solo
N = 6 14 34 55 41 60 210
% 2.0% 4.8% 6.2% 8.0% 9.8% 18.2% 8.2%
Small firm (2-
20 lawyers)
N = 22 31 97 144 87 87 468




N = 18 29 68 74 48 19 256




N = 14 23 37 40 18 6 138
% 4.7% 7.9% 6.8% 5.8% 4.3% 1.8% 5.4%
Mega firms 
(251+)
N = 85 56 82 74 40 6 343
% 28.7% 19.3% 15.0% 10.7% 9.6% 1.8% 13.3%
Federal, state, 
legal service & 
public interest
N = 48 42 82 129 72 58 431
% 16.2% 14.5% 15.0% 18.7% 17.2% 17.6% 16.8%
Non-profit
N = 45 31 48 42 25 33 224




N = 39 44 60 71 51 28 293
% 13.2% 15.2% 11.0% 10.3% 12.2% 8.5% 11.4%
Other
N = 19 20 38 61 36 33 207
% 6.4% 6.9% 7.0% 8.8% 8.6% 10.0% 8.1%
Total
% 296 290 546 690 418 330 2570*
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of 
Total 11.5% 11.3% 21.2% 26.8% 16.3% 12.8% 100.0%
*Table based on respondents who answered both W1 and W2 surveys.
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Table 3. AJD1 and AJD2 Income by Practice Setting (Median: full-time 
workers only)
Practice setting AJD1 median AJD2 median % Change
Solo $50,000 $80,000 60
Firm 2-20 lawyers $55,000 $90,000 64
Firm 21-100 
lawyers $78,000 $110,000 41
Firm 101-250 
lawyers $98,000 $125,000 28
Firm 251+ lawyers $135,000 $180,000 33
Govt.—federal $63,000 $100,000 59
Govt.—state $44,500 $65,000 46
Legal services or 
public def. $39,000 $60,000 54
Public interest $40,000 $65,000 63
Non-profit or 
education $50,000 $71,000 42
Business—inside 
counsel $90,000 $150,000 67
Business—not 
practicing $75,000 $100,000 33
Other $67,400 $80,000 19
Overall total $70,000 $98,000 40
Note: Using National Sample Income—includes salary, bonus and profit 
sharing. (From AJDII report).
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Table 5. Wave 1: Mean Debt by Law School Rank and Whether Attended 
Private or Public Law School
Public or private 
law school Law school rank Mean debt N
1.00
Private




Tier 3 77480.14 317








Tier 3 57710.53 57
Tier 4 54734.37 32
Total 57883.95 841
Total




Tier 3 74467.13 374
Tier 4 73056.46 294
Total 72204.11 2308
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Table 6. Wave 2: Mean Debt by Law School Rank and Private or Public 
School
Law school rank Public or private law school Mean N
Top 10
1.00 Private 46500.34 118
2.00 Public 44256.52 46
Total 45870.98 164
11-20
1.00 Private 60815.90 123
2.00 Public 40652.78 72
Total 53371.06 195
21-50
1.00 Private 55806.25 160
2.00 Public 43163.55 214
Total 48572.19 374
51-100
1.00 Private 67910.97 263
2.00 Public 49414.61 245
Total 58990.48 508
Tier 3
1.00 Private 62659.73 263
2.00 Public 49240.22 46
Total 60662.01 309
Tier 4
1.00 Private 68981.20 224
2.00 Public 48240.00 25
Total 66898.75 249
Total
1.00 Private 62283.48 1151
2.00 Public 45952.82 648
Total 56401.17 1799
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Table 7. Wave 2: No Debt by Rank of Law School (Respondents Answered 
Both Wave 1 and Wave 2)
No debt Debt remaining Total
.00 1.00
Top 10
Count 150 172 322
% within law school tier 46.6% 53.4% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 16.4% 9.1% 11.5%
% of total 5.4% 6.2% 11.5%
11-20
Count 121 204 325
% within law school tier 37.2% 62.8% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 13.3% 10.9% 11.6%
% of total 4.3% 7.3% 11.6%
21-50
Count 193 392 585
% within law school tier 33.0% 67.0% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 21.1% 20.9% 20.9%
% of total 6.9% 14.0% 20.9%
51-100
Count 222 536 758
% within law school tier 29.3% 70.7% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 24.3% 28.5% 27.1%
% of total 7.9% 19.2% 27.1%
Tier 3
Count 133 316 449
% within law school tier 29.6% 70.4% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 14.6% 16.8% 16.1%
% of total 4.8% 11.3% 16.1%
Tier 4
Count 94 260 354
% within law school tier 26.6% 73.4% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 10.3% 13.8% 12.7%
% of total 3.4% 9.3% 12.7%
Total
Count 913 1880 2793
% within law school tier 32.7% 67.3% 100.0%
% by debt remaining 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Table 8. Report—Debt to Income Converted to Percentage for W1 and W2: 
By Law School Rank and Private or Public Law School*
Rank Was law school public or private
W1 percent debt to 
income





























































































Std. deviation 89.85 84.49
*Table composed of respondents who completed W1 and W2 surveys.
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Table 9. % Reduction of Debt to Income Between W1 & W2
Law School Rank Private/public LS % Reduction debt/Inc.








Tier 3 Private 35.20%
Public 53.98%
Tier 4 Private 31.54%
Public 34.59%
